I have written other pieces on the topic of fractional
reserve banking here
and here
duration mismatch, which is when someone borrows shortterm money to lend
longterm and how falling interest rates actually encourages duration
mismatch (http://keithweiner.posterous.com/fallinginterestratesanddurationmismatch).
Falling interest rates are a feature of our current monetary regime, so
central that any look at a graph of 10year Treasury yields shows that it is
a ratchet (and a racket, but that is a topic for another day!). There are
corrections, but over 31 years the rate of interest has been falling too
steadily and for too long to be the product of random chance. It is a
salient, if not the central fact, of life in the irredeemable US dollar system,
as I have written
(http://keithweiner.posterous.com/irredeemablepapermoneyfeature451).
Here is a graph of the interest rate on the 10year US
Treasury bond. The graph begins in the second half of July 1981. This was the
peak of the parabolic rise interest rates, with the rate at around 16%.
Today, the rate is 1.6%.
Pathological
Falling Interest Rates
Professor Antal Fekete introduced the proposition that a falling interest
rate (as opposed to a low and stable rate) causes capital destruction. But all
other economists, commentators, and observers miss the point. It is no less a
phenomenon for being unseen. In early 2008, a question was left begging: how
could a company like Bear Stearns which had strong and growing net income
collapse so suddenly?
Here is Bear's fiveyear net income and total
shareholder's equity:
Year

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Income

$1.156B

$1.345B

$1.462B

$2.054B

$0.233

Equity

$7.47B

$8.99B

$10.8B

$12.1B

$11.8B

Isn't that odd? Even in 2007, Bear shows a profit. And
they show robust growth in shareholder equity, with only a minor setback in
2007.
And yet, by early 2008 Bear experienced what I will
call Sudden Capital Death Syndrome. JP Morgan bought them on Mar 16, for just
over $1B. But the deal hinged on the Fed taking on $29B of Bear's
liabilities, so the real enterprise value was closer to $19B.
Obviously, Bear's reported "profit" was not
real. And neither was their "shareholder's equity". I think it something
much more serious than just a simple case of fraud. Simple fraud could not
explain why almost the entire banking industry ran out of capital at the same
time, after years of reporting good earnings and paying dividends and bonuses
to management.
Also, other prominent companies were going bankrupt in
2008 and 2009 as well. These included Nortel Networks, General Growth
Partners, AIG, two big automakers.
I place the blame for Sudden Capital Death Syndrome on
falling interest rates. The key to understanding this is to look at a bond as
a security. This security has a market price that can go up and down. It is
not controversial to say that when the rate of interest falls, the price of a
bond rises. This is a simple and rigid mathematical relationship, like a
teetertotter.
A bond issuer is short a bond. Unlike a homeowner who
takes out a mortgage on his house, a bond issuer cannot simply
"refinance". If it wants to pay off the debt, it must buy the bonds
back in the market, at the current market price.
Let's repeat that. Anyone who issues a bond is short a
security and that security can go up in price as well as go down in
price.
Everyone understands that if a bond goes up, the
bondholder gets a capital gain. This is not controversial at all. Nor is it
controversial to say that there are two sides to every trade. And yet it is
highly controversial—to the point of being rejected with
scorn—that the other side of the trade from the bondholder incurs the
capital loss. It is the bond issuer's capital that flows to the bondholder.
To reject this is to say that money grows on trees.
We won't explore that any further; money does not grow
on trees! Instead, we will look at this phenomenon of the capital loss of the
bond issuer from several angles: (1) Hold Until Maturity; (2) Mark to Market;
(3) Two Borrowers, Same Amount; (4) Two Borrowers, Different Amounts; (5) Net
Present Value; (6) Capitalizing an Income; (7) Amortization of Plant; and (8)
Real Meaning of an Interest Rate.
Hold Until Maturity
There is an argument that the bond issuer can just keep
paying until maturity. While that may be true in some circumstances, it
misses the point. When one enters into a position in a financial market, one
must mark one's losses as they occur, no matter than one may intend to hold
the position until maturity. How would a broker respond in the case of a
client who shorted a stock and the stock rose in price subsequently? Would
the broker demand that the client post more margin?
Or would the broker be sympathetic if the client explained how the company
had poor prospects and that the client intended to hold the short position
until the company's share price reflected the truth?
Mark to Market
The guiding principle of accounting is that it must
paint an accurate and conservative picture of the current state of one's
finances. It is not the consideration of the accountant that things may
improve. If things improve, then in the future the financial statement will
look better! In the meantime, the standard in accounting (notwithstanding the
outrageous FASB decision in 2009 to suspend "mark to market") is to
mark assets at the lower of: (A) the original acquisition price, or (B) the
current market price.
There ought to be a corresponding rule for liabilities:
mark liabilities at the higher of (A) original sale price, or (B) current
market price. Unfortunately, the field of accounting developed its principles
in an era where a fall in the rate of interest from 16% to 1.6% would have
been inconceivable. And so today, liabilities are not marked up as the rate
of interest falls down.
Refusing to put ink on paper does not change the
reality, however. Closing one's eyes does not prevent one from falling into a
pit on the path in front of one's feet. The capital loss is very real, as we
will explore further below.
Two Borrowers, Same Amount
Let's look at two hypothetical companies in the same
industry, pencil manufacturing. Smithwick Pen sells
a 20year $10M bond at 8% interest. It uses the proceeds to buy pencilmanufacturing
equipment. To fully amortize the $10M over 20 years, Smithwick
must pay $83,644 per month.
The rate of interest now falls to half its previous
rate. Barnaby Crayon sells a 20year $10M bond at 4%. Barnaby buys the same
equipment as Smithwick and becomes Smithwick's competitor. Barnaby pays $60,598 per month to
amortize the same $10M debt. Is it correct to say that both companies have
identical balance sheets? Obviously Barnaby will have a better income
statement. This is because it has a superior capital position, and this
should be reflected on the balance sheets. It certainly is not because of its
superior product, management, or marketing.
Let's look at this from the perspective of the capital
position: the present value of a stream of payments. Obviously, at 4%
interest the monthly payment of $60,598 has a present value of $10M
(otherwise we made a mistake in the math somewhere). But what is the value of
an $83,644 monthly payment at the new, lower rate of 4%? It is $13.8M. Smithwick's has just experienced the erosion of $3.8M of
capital! This is reflected in reality, by the uncontroversial statement that
it has a permanent competitive disadvantage compared to Barnaby. Barnaby can
undercut Smithwick and set prices wherever it
wishes. Smithwick is helpless. Most likely, Barnaby
will eke out a subsistence living, until the rate of interest falls further.
When Cromwell Writing Instruments borrows money at 2%, then Smithwick will be put out of its misery. And Barnaby will
be forced into the untenable position it had previously placed Smithwick.
It should be noted that the longer the bond maturity,
the bigger this problem becomes. For example, if this were a 30year bond,
then Smithwick would take a $5.4M hit to its
capital if interest rates were 8% when it issued the bond and then fell to
4%.
Two Borrowers, Different Amounts
This is not the only way that a competitor can exploit
the capital loss of a company who made the mistake of borrowing at a toohigh
interest rate. Let's look at the case of Poddy Hoddy Hotel and Casino. Poddy
sells a 20year $100M bond at 8%, and has a monthly payment of $836K. It
builds a nice hotel and casino with bars, a restaurant, a pool, and a few
jewelry stores.
A short while later, Xtreme
Hotels sells a $138M bond at 4%, and has the same monthly payments. The extra
$38M goes into a second pool with a swimup bar, another restaurant that is
themed based on the Galapagos Islands, bigger and more opulent retail stores,
and a spiral glass elevator to take guests up to their rooms while enjoying
the breathtaking 270degree views of the city.
Which hotel will consumers prefer?
The Poddy Hoddy
Hotel may have been planned based on accurate market research that showed
real demand for such a hotel in that location. Unfortunately, the falling
interest rate has undermined it. Its investors will likely lose money.
The Xtreme Hotel, on the
other hand, is probably a malinvestment. It is likely a project for which
there is no real demand. But the falling interest rate gives a false signal
to the entrepreneur to build it. Of course, the Xtreme
won't be the one to experience Sudden Capital Death Syndrome first. That fate
will befall Poddy. Xtreme's
turn will come later, at a lower interest rate.
With Smithwick, one might argue
that it can pay off its bond in the 20 years it originally expected, so it
has not experienced a loss. But in fact, there is a loss even from this
angle. Smithwick is paying off its 8% bond at
$83,644 per month. But the rate of interest is now 4%, which should be a
payment of $60,598. The accurate way to look at this is that Smithwick is paying off a marketrate bond plus a penalty
of $23,046 for every month remaining before the bond is fully amortized.
With Poddy Hoddy, one might similarly argue that it can pay off its
bond as planned, so it has not taken a loss. But the loss here is even
clearer. By borrowing $100M at a rate that was too high, it has effectively
dissipated the extra $38M that its competitor, Xtreme,
put to good use. It will pay for this waste every month for 20 years (or
until it goes bankrupt).
By not marking the losses at Smithwick
and Poddy, the accountants are not doing these
companies or their investors any favors. In the short run, these companies
may declare "profits" and based on that pay dividends to investors
and bonuses to management. But sooner or later, they will meet Barnaby and Xtreme who will deal the coup de grace of Sudden Capital
Death Syndrome.
Net Present Value
As alluded above, one can
calculate the Net Present Value (NPV) of a stream of payments. First, let's
look at the formula to calculate the present value of a single payment is:
It should be obvious that the present value of a
payment is lower the farther into the future it is to be made. One does not
value a payment due in 2042 the same as a payment to be made next year. What is
not so glaring is that the value is lower for higher rates of interest. A
$1000 payment due next year is worth $909 if the rate of interest is 10%, but
$990 at 1%. This difference is amplified due to compounding. At 10 years, the
payment is worth $385 at 10% versus $905 at 1%.
The NPV of a stream of payments is the sum of the value
of each payment. The value of a $1000 payment made annually for 20 years is
$9818 at 8% interest. That same payment at 4% has an NPV of $13,590, a 38%
increase.
It is important to emphasize that while the bond
issuer's monthly payment is fixed based on the amount of capital raised and
the interest rate at the time, the NPV of its liability must be calculated at
the current rate of interest. The market (and the universe) does not know nor
care what bond issuer's entry point was. Objectively, all streams of
payments of $1000 per month have the same value at a given maturity and
current interest rate, regardless of the original rate.
Capitalizing an Income
Let's look at this from yet another angle. An income
can be capitalized, and the purpose of capital is to produce an income.
Professor Antal Fekete
wrote:
"Suppose you are a worker taking home $50,000 a year
in wages. When your incomeflow is capitalized at the current rate of
interest of, say, 5 percent, you arrive at the figure of $1,000,000. The sum
of one million dollars or its equivalent in physical capital must exist
somewhere, in some form, the yield of which will continue paying your wages.
Capital has been accumulated and turned into plant and equipment to support
you at work. Part of your employer's capital is the wage fund that backs your
employment. Assuming, of course, that no one is allowed to tamper with the
rate of interest." [Emphasis in the original]
"Suppose for the sake of argument that the rate of
interest is cut in half to 2½ percent. Nothing could be clearer than
the fact that the $1,000,000 wage fund is no longer adequate to support your
payroll, as its annual yield has been reduced to $25,000. This can be
described by saying that every time the rate of interest is cut by half, capital is being destroyed, wiping out half of the
wage fund. Unless compensation is made by adding more capital, your
employment is no longer supported by a full slate of capital as before. Since
productivity is nothing but the result of combining labor and capital, the
productivity of your job has been impaired. You are in danger of being laid off ? or forced to take a wage
cut of $25,000."
Without capital, human productivity is barely enough to
produce a subsistence living. Without tools, one is obliged to work long
hours at backbreaking tasks in order to have a meager meal, some sort of
clothing, and something to keep the rain off one's head. Capital destruction
is the process of moving backwards towards a time where one worked harder to
obtain less.
As described earlier, when the rate of interest falls,
it erodes the capital of every bond issuer. If one looks at this capital as
being the wage fund (or part of it is the wage fund), then the bond issuer
can no longer afford to pay its employees the same wage. If it does continue
the same wage anyway, it will eventually suffer the consequences of running out
of capital.
Amortization of Plant
Now let's consider the concept of amortizing equipment
and plant at Smithwick Pen. Smithwick
borrows $10M to buy equipment. Out of its revenues, it must set aside
something to amortize this over the useful life of the equipment, which is 20
years in our example. This setaside reduces net income; it is not profit but
capital maintenance assuming the company intends to remain in business after
the current generation of equipment and plant wears out.
How much should it set aside every month? This is the
inverse of the NPV calculation. We are now interested in the current monthly
payment to arrive at a fixed sum at a future point in time (as opposed to the
present value of a stream of fixed payments). The lower the rate of interest,
the more Smithwick must set aside every month in
order to reach the goal by the deadline. To understand this, just look at
what Smithwick must do. Each month, it puts some
money into an interestbearing account or bond. Even if it chooses the longest
possible maturity for each payment (i.e. the first payment is put into a
20year bond, the next into a 19year 11month bond, etc.) it is clear that
if interest rates are falling then each payment must increase to compensate. Smithwick's profits are falling with the rate of
interest!
If Smithwick persists in
setting aside every month what it initially calculated when it purchased the
pencilmaking equipment, it will have a shortfall at the end, when it needs
to replace the equipment.
Real Meaning of an Interest Rate
Let's consider what it really means to have a high or a
low rate of interest. I propose to do reductio
ad absurdum. We will look at two cases (which would be pathological if
they occurred) to make the point clearer.
The first case is if the rate of interest is 100%. This
means that a $1000 payment one year from today is worth ½ of the
nominal value, or $500 today. A payment due in two years is worth $250 today,
etc. At this rate of interest, for whatever reason, "future money"
is worth very little present money. In other words, the burden experienced by
the debtor is a small fraction of the nominal value of the debt.
The second case is if the rate of interest is zero.
This means that a $1000 payment due one year from today or 100 years from
today is worth $1000 today. At this rate of interest, for whatever reason,
future money is worth every penny of its nominal value today. There is no
discount at all, not for the loss of use of the money in the meantime, not
for the risk, not for currency debasement. In other words, the burden
experienced by the debtor is the full nominal value of the debt.
Again, to emphasize, one must use the current market
rate of interest not the rate of interest contracted by the borrower
at the time of the bond issuance.
The lower the rate of interest, the more highly one
values a future payment. The higher the rate of interest, the more highly one
discounts a future payment. These statements are true whether one is the payer
or the payee. The payer and payee are just parties on opposite sides of the
same trade.
Irving Fisher, writing about falling prices (I shall
address the connection between falling prices and falling interest rates in a
forthcoming paper) proposed a paradox:
"The more the debtors pay, the more they
owe."
Debtors slowly pay down their debts and reduce the
principle owed. This would reduce the NPV of their debts in a normal
environment. But in a fallinginterestrate environment, the NPV of outstanding
debt is rising due to the falling interest rate at a pace much faster than it
is falling due to debtors' payments. The debtors are on a treadmill and they
are going backwards at an accelerating rate.
How apropos is Fisher's eloquent sentence summarizing
the problem!
http://www.wikinvest.com/stock/Bear_Stearns_Companies_(BSC)#History
http://www.wikinvest.com/stock/Bear_Stearns_Companies_(BSC)/Data/Balance_Sheet#Balance_Sheet
http://www.professorfekete.com/articles/AEFLaborLeaders.pdf
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/meltzer/fisdeb33.pdf
