|
|
But are We the People themselves to any worthwhile
degree in charge of protecting “the continuity of government”?
No. NSPD-51 mandates that We the People are to be subject to the
President’s “guidance”—or, more realistically, to the
“guidance” of those bureaucrats and other nameless, faceless,
conscienceless operatives the President appoints to carry out his
“directives,” “executive orders,”
“proclamations,” and other ukases. Which means that, when the
“[c]atastrophic emergency” the Establishment is obviously expecting
finally occurs, We the People are likely to lose every vestige of control
over their own government, as that government is transmogrified before their
very eyes into an hydrocephalic monster.
C.
So, what is the solution? To require that plans for maintaining “the
continuity of government” must build, not upon the ever-shifting
political sands of the Leader Principle, but instead upon the same
constitutionally firm foundations as have supported the General Government
from the beginning.
These
foundations certainly do include a central role for the President. The
Constitution requires that the President “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.” Article II, Section 3.
To
enable him to fulfill this duty, the Constitution appoints the President as
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of
the Militia of the several States, when called into actual Service of the
United States.” Article II, Section 2, Clause 1. And to make effective
the President’s authority in that particular, the Constitution mandates
that Congress “provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the
Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions,”
whenever “necessary and proper.” Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15
and 18.
As
far as maintaining “the continuity of government” goes, however,
Americans need not worry about the readiness of “the Army and the Navy
of the United States.” Doubtlessly, the Pentagon has already drafted
multiple contingency plans for all conceivable—and many inconceivable—emergencies.
Moreover, prudent patriots will want to minimize the participation of the
Armed Forces in the process. For true “continuity of government”
will be ill-served by anything that smacks of “martial law.”
Therefore,
America’s plans for maintaining “the continuity of
government” must look, first and foremost, to “the Militia of the
several States.” And rightly so. For, self-evidently, a critically
important component of what the Second Amendment calls “the security of
a free State” must be “the continuity of government.” But
the Second Amendment teaches that “[a] well regulated Militia,”
based upon “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,” is
“necessary to the security of a free State.” Consequentially,
such a Militia must be necessary to “the continuity of
government.”
“[T]he
Militia of the several States” are the only institutions to which the
Constitution explicitly assigns the responsibilities “to execute the
Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.” Article
I, Section 8, Clause 15. This is because the Constitution recognizes only
“[a] well regulated Militia” as being “necessary to the
security of a free State.” And that is because We the People knew in
the late 1700s, and ought to know now, that “the Militia of several
States” are the only governmental institutions We the People can
completely trust—inasmuch as they are the only governmental
institutions that completely identify with the people through being composed
of the people.
To
be sure, for purposes of obtaining uniformity where it is “necessary
and proper,” the Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such
Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States.”
Article I, Section 8, Clauses 16 and 18. Nonetheless, whatever Congress does
or fails to do, the Militia remain permanent constitutional institutions,
each part of its own State government, to be organized and deployed on a
Local basis from among all able-bodied Americans from 16 to 60 years of age.
Moreover,
“the Militia of the several States” are not, and can never be,
part of “the Army and Navy of the United States.” This is
obvious, not only from the dual role of the President as “Commander in
Chief” of both “the Army and Navy of the United States” and
“the Militia of the several States,” but also from the separate
and distinct powers of Congress with respect to these entities. Compare
Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 with Article I, Section 8, Clauses 12 through
16.
So,
by employing “the Militia of the several States” to preserve
“the continuity of government,” Americans can rely upon: both the
separation and the cooperation of powers among the States, Congress, and the
President, under constitutional standards —federalism;
- control over and participation in operations
from the bottom up—the subsidiarity and decentralization necessary
for rational economic calculation;
- avoidance of entanglements with “martial
law;” and
- the Constitution’s assurance that their
course of action is not simply expedient but is “necessary to the
security of a free State.”
In
addition, reliance on “the Militia of the several States” would
guarantee a real, permanent “continuity of government” in actual
practice—because the Militia in all fifty States are not subject to
being entirely knocked out by any conceivable attack or natural disaster
(short of an epidemic that eradicated most of the human race).
Finally,
if Americans turn to “the Militia of the several States” before a
“[c]atastrophic emergency” occurs, they can rest assured that
actual “continuity of government” will be maintained, not only in
form, but also in substance. Because of the Militia’s identity with We
the People, no plan for maintaining “the continuity of
government” that involves the Militia can possibly operate as a mere
cover for the organization and deployment of a National police-state
apparatus, let alone for the elaboration of a full-blown Fuhrer state. For
with the Militia in the process, it will be the President’s
constitutional duty to employ them, and their constitutional duty and ability
to ensure that he does so—in all cases, constitutionally.
The
present situation, however, is far from this ideal. Nothing that corresponds
to “[a] well regulated Militia” exists in any State of the Union
today. To the contrary: Rather than being organized, armed, disciplined,
governed, and trained as the Constitution requires, most Americans have been
consigned by Congressional and State statutes to the constitutionally
oxymoronic “unorganized militia.”
Of
course, NSPD-51 does not address revitalization of, let alone reliance on,
“the Militia of the several States,” because its authors want to
impose “guidance” from the top down, not organize and empower We
the People from the bottom up. And apparently no one else in public office
within the Disgrace of Columbia—or in any of the States, for that
matter— is giving any consideration to what the Constitution tells
America is “necessary to the security of a free State.”
What
needs to be done at the National level is obvious. If the President wants to
issue “directives” that constitutionally address the problem of
maintaining “the continuity of government”, he should promulgate
one, in his capacity as “Commander in Chief * * * of the Militia of the
several States,” that establishes an All-American Militia Commission,
consisting of representatives of the Executive Branch, representatives of the
Governors of each of the fifty States, and a staff of suitable
experts—to meet in the area of Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts.
The Commission’s task should be two-fold—
First,
to draft a model State statute for revitalizing the Militia in each State,
leaving each of the State’s delegations to: (i) add whatever special
provisions may be necessary for their own State’s peculiar situation or
needs; and then (ii) adapt the whole to their State’s code of laws.
Second,
to draft a model Congressional statute, complementary with the model State
statute, that: (i) sets out the “necessary and proper” uniform
National standards for organizing, arming, disciplining, governing, and
training the Militia; and (ii) delineates the Militia’s role in the
General Government’s programs of “homeland security” and
“the continuity of government,” when “employed in the
actual Service of the United States.”
The
Congressional bill should also provide for fifty Militia Aides de Camp and
one Commandant of the Corps of Militia Aides de Camp to be appointed by the
President to serve as his liaisons to each of “the Militia of the
several States.” These Aides de Camp would be experts in “homeland
security” and “the continuity of government” who would
transfer the President’s orders to the States’ Militias, see that
those orders are carried out, and otherwise observe, report, advise, and
assist in whatever ways might prove necessary, proper, and expedient.
The
President and the Governors would then use their best offices to see these
bills enacted into law in Congress and the several States’ legislatures
without delay.
If
begun now, and with sufficient expenditure of effort—especially in the
form of political pressure applied by the President and the
Governors—this project might be completed before 2009. Should that
happen, it would constitute a positive legacy of the Bush Administration that
all patriotic Americans would applaud.
On
the other hand, if a Presidential candidate included this proposal as a major
plank in his (or her) platform for the 2008 election, it would surely garner
widespread support—although perhaps only Representative Ron Paul would
be believable as an advocate for revitalizing the Militia.
Notwithstanding
that convening an All-American Militia Commission would constitute perhaps
the most straightforward, the simplest, and the constitutionally safest way
to preserve “the continuity of government” while simultaneously
avoiding a Fuhrer state, even I doubt that my recommendation will become an
issue in the National forum, let alone actually be adopted by the incumbent
President or promoted by any Presidential candidate. (Of course, if in
February of 2009 President Ron Paul appoints me to preside over his
All-American Militia Commission, and thereafter to serve as the first
Commandant of the Corps of Militia Aides de Camp, I shall not disappoint
him.)
Just
as with monetary and banking reform, and many other issues critical to America’s
survival, the problem with revitalizing “the Militia of the several
States” all at once, on a National scale, is that too many of the good
people who should be working to implement the Constitution in their own and
their country’s interests are ignorant, apathetic, beaten down, tired,
and frightened.
To
a large degree this is because, day in and day out, they tune in on, believe,
and conform their behavior to the self-contradictory, defeatist nonsense that
pours from the mouths of media propagandists—rather than investigating,
thinking, and acting for themselves. The degenerative process that grips
their minds could be styled “intellectual spongification:” They
passively absorb the propagandists’ drool to the point of saturation
and stultification, apparently unable or unwilling ever to wring themselves
out.
On
the other hand, certainly not all Americans, and probably not even commanding
majorities in each State, suffer from terminal intellectual spongification.
Which explains why—although the exercise sometimes resembles an attempt
to swim up Niagara Falls in a barrel—I continue to promote
revitalization of “the Militia of the several States” by We the
People themselves, on a State-by-State basis. If enough Americans can be found
in even one State to start the ball rolling, it will prove that an
aristocracy of patriots in private life can outflank the kakistocracy in
public office.
This
strategy is not with precedent. In 1913, attacking the Federal Reserve bill
and the Money Power behind it, Representative Charles Lindbergh observed that
[t]he
political cowardice existing in this Capitol will prevent adequate reform
until the people themselves realize more fully the burden that is placed on
them by the interest, dividends, rents, and profits allowed by law, and
collected by banks and others who control centralized wealth.
The
money power overawes the legislative and executive forces of the Nation and
of the States. * * * [T]he people can secure no help from Congress until
public sentiment is directed to a specific bill in the people’s
interests. There has been a strong sentiment for reform, but it has not been
directed to a specific remedy, and, therefore, the Money Trust has taken
advantage of the sentiment, and under disguise has put forward its own
bill—the bill that is about to become a law. Had the people presented a
bill and demanded Congress to pass it, Congress would not dare to pass this
bill as a Christmas present to the Money Trust. * * * * *
* * * [T]he
greatest prospect for reform is for the people themselves to frame concrete
measures and present them to Congress and demand their adoption. If it is
left to Congress to draft bills, they will be drafted in the interest of the
Money Trust as the present bill has been. The people have much more to gain
from their own work than they generally realize. They are paying for all the
things that are being done, and they have the opportunity, if they will avail
themselves of it, to so organize that they may secure the fruits of their own
industry, instead of letting the parasites enjoy it.
Congressional
Record, Volume 51, at 1446-1447.
How
right Lindbergh was! If Americans had taken his advice, this country would
not now be facing a monetary and banking crisis of unprecedented proportions.
But, as the old adage has it, “We grow too soon old, and too late
smart!” Well,
maybe not yet “too late”...
Of
course, Lindbergh’s recommendation probably no longer holds for the
present-day Congress. Congress is too deeply in the clutches of vicious
special-interest groups, both domestic and foreign, to turn its attentions to
“the common defence” or “the general Welfare” by revitalizing
“the Militia of the several States” at We the People’s
request. But some of the State legislatures are another matter—for a
while at least.
So
patriots cannot allow what may prove to be their last fleeting opportunity to
go by the boards. If they do, the Fuhrer state waiting in the wings will
impress upon them the error of their ways.
Edwin
Vieira
|
|
