Contrary to popular perception, the Old West was much more peaceful than
American cities are today. The real culture of violence on the frontier
during the latter half of the nineteenth century sprang from the U.S.
government's policies toward the Plains Indians.
The Not-So-Wild, Wild West
In a thorough review of the “West was violent” literature, Bruce Benson
(1998) discovered that many historians simply assume that violence was
pervasive — even more so than in modern-day America — and then theorize about
its likely causes. In addition, some authors assume that the West was very
violent and then assert, as Joe Franz does, that “American violence today
reflects our frontier heritage” (Franz 1969, qtd. in Benson 1998, 98). Thus,
an allegedly violent and stateless society of the nineteenth century is
blamed for at least some of the violence in the United States today.
In a book-length survey of the “West was violent” literature, historian
Roger McGrath echoes Benson's skepticism about this theory when he writes
that “the frontier-was-violent authors are not, for the most part, attempting
to prove that the frontier was violent. Rather, they assume that it was
violent and then proffer explanations for that alleged violence” (1984, 270).
In contrast, an alternative literature based on actual history concludes
that the civil society of the American West in the nineteenth century was not
very violent. Eugene Hollon writes that the western frontier “was a far more
civilized, more peaceful and safer place than American society today” (1974,
x). Terry Anderson and P. J. Hill affirm that although “[t]he West . . . is
perceived as a place of great chaos, with little respect for property or
life,” their research “indicates that this was not the case; property rights
were protected and civil order prevailed. Private agencies provided the
necessary basis for an orderly society in which property was protected and
conflicts were resolved” (1979, 10).
What were these private protective agencies? They were not governments
because they did not have a legal monopoly on keeping order. Instead, they
included such organizations as land clubs, cattlemen's associations, mining
camps, and wagon trains.
So-called land clubs were organizations established by settlers before the
U.S. government even surveyed the land, let alone started to sell it or give
it away. Because disputes over land titles are inevitable, the land clubs
adopted their own constitutions, laying out the “laws” that would define and
protect property rights in land (Anderson and Hill 1979, 15). They
administered land claims, protected them from outsiders, and arbitrated
disputes. Social ostracism was used effectively against those who violated
the rules. Establishing property rights in this way minimized disputes — and
violence.
The wagon trains that transported thousands of people to the California
gold fields and other parts of the West usually established their own
constitutions before setting out. These constitutions often included detailed
judicial systems. As a consequence, writes Benson, “[t]here were few
instances of violence on the wagon trains even when food became extremely
scarce and starvation threatened. When crimes against persons or their
property were committed, the judicial system . . . would take effect” (1998,
102). Ostracism and threats of banishment from the group, instead of threats
of violence, were usually sufficient to correct rule breakers' behavior.
Dozens of movies have portrayed the nineteenth-century mining camps in the
West as hot beds of anarchy and violence, but John Umbeck discovered that,
beginning in 1848, the miners began forming contracts with one another to
restrain their own behavior (1981, 51). There was no government authority in
California at the time, apart from a few military posts. The miners'
contracts established property rights in land (and in any gold found on the
land) that the miners themselves enforced. Miners who did not accept the
rules the majority adopted were free to mine elsewhere or to set up their own
contractual arrangements with other miners. The rules that were adopted were
often consequently established with unanimous consent (Anderson and Hill
1979, 19). As long as a miner abided by the rules, the other miners defended
his rights under the community contract. If he did not abide by the agreed-on
rules, his claim would be regarded as “open to any [claim] jumpers” (Umbeck
1981, 53).
The mining camps hired “enforcement specialists” — justices of the peace
and arbitrators — and developed an extensive body of property and criminal
law. As a result, there was very little violence and theft. The fact that the
miners were usually armed also helps to explain why crime was relatively
infrequent. Benson concludes, “The contractual system of law effectively
generated cooperation rather than conflict, and on those occasions when
conflict arose it was, by and large, effectively quelled through nonviolent
means” (1998, 105).
When government bureaucrats failed to police cattle rustling effectively,
ranchers established cattlemen's associations that drew up their own
constitutions and hired private “protection agencies” that were often staffed
by expert gunmen. This action deterred cattle rustling. Some of these
“gunmen” did “drift in and out of a life of crime,” write Anderson and Hill
(1979, 18), but they were usually dealt with by the cattlemen's associations
and never created any kind of large-scale criminal organization, as some have
predicted would occur under a regime of private law enforcement.
In sum, this work by Benson, Anderson and Hill, Umbeck, and others
challenges with solid historical research the claims made by the “West was
violent” authors. The civil society of the American West in the nineteenth
century was much more peaceful than American cities are today, and the
evidence suggests that in fact the Old West was not a very violent place at
all. History also reveals that the expanded presence of the U.S. government
was the real cause of a culture of violence in the American West. If there is
anything to the idea that a nineteenth-century culture of violence on the
American frontier is the genesis of much of the violence in the United States
today, the main source of that culture is therefore government, not civil
society.
The Real Cause of Violence in the American West
The real culture of violence in the American West of the latter half of
the nineteenth century sprang from the U.S. government's policies toward the
Plains Indians. It is untrue that white European settlers were always at war
with Indians, as popular folklore contends. After all, Indians assisted the
Pilgrims and celebrated the first Thanksgiving with them; John Smith married
Pocahontas; a white man (mostly Scots, with some Cherokee), John Ross, was
the chief of the Cherokees of Tennessee and North Carolina; and there was
always a great deal of trade with Indians, as opposed to violence. As
Jennifer Roback has written, “Europeans generally acknowledged that the
Indians retained possessory rights to their lands. More important, the
English recognized the advantage of being on friendly terms with the Indians.
Trade with the Indians, especially the fur trade, was profitable. War was
costly” (1992, 9). Trade and cooperation with the Indians were much more
common than conflict and violence during the first half of the nineteenth
century.
Terry Anderson and Fred McChesney relate how Thomas Jefferson found that
during his time negotiation was the Europeans' predominant means of acquiring
land from Indians (1994, 56). By the twentieth century, some $800 million had
been paid for Indian lands. These authors also argue that various factors can
alter the incentives for trade, as opposed to waging a war of conquest as a means
of acquiring land. One of the most important factors is the existence of a
standing army, as opposed to militias, which were used in the American West
prior to the War Between the States. On this point, Anderson and McChesney
quote Adam Smith, who wrote that “‘[i]n a militia, the character of the
labourer, artificer, or tradesman, predominates over that of the soldier: in
a standing army, that of the soldier predominates over every other
character.'” (1994, 52). A standing army, according to Anderson and
McChesney, “creates a class of professional soldiers whose personal welfare
increases with warfare, even if fighting is a negative-sum act for the
population as a whole” (52).
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