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The existence of gold market
intervention is known widely among experts. However there is very little
awareness that there are actually distinct phases of intervention. But these
phases in particular are essential when considering the current state of the gold
market.
Intervention aimed at
countering rising gold prices has occurred for many years. One of the reasons
is efforts by central banks to quell doubts about monetary stability. Despite
such primary objectives - leading characters, motives and times do not form a
coherent unit. In particular there are clearly distinguishable phases.
Phase I
As early as 1993, worries
circulated among central bankers over rises in the inflation-rate and the
lasting functionality of the monetary system. The European Monetary System
had collapsed and gold prices had increased dramatically during the first
half of the year. There was a danger that a further increase in price would
signal a rise in inflation and that, because of expectations, inflation would
indeed return strongly. Some central banks, including the FED, agreed at the
beginning of July not to tolerate gold prices above 400 dollars an ounce.
Unperturbed, the price of gold marched higher topping the mark. The day had
come: On August 5, 1993 at 8:27 AM (all time values are US Eastern time); the
pact was put into action. Massive sales, mainly on the Comex futures market
in New York, triggered a price free-fall. The sudden drop was supposed to
unsettle investors and persuade them to stay away from the gold market. To
this day, sudden price pullbacks are a key characteristic of systematic gold
market interventions. The following chart shows the intra-day price movement
of gold on August 5, 1993, the beginning of the systematic interventions.
Figure 1: Gold Intraday on August 5, 1993
Phase II
The physical metal required
for pushing gold prices lower found its way to the market both through sales
and lending activities. The so-called gold carry trade involves lending gold
to interested market participants, who then sell it on the market using proceeds
to invest in other higher-yielding assets. Since gold carry traders now owe
gold they have a vested interest in seeing lower gold prices. If they can
clear their books or back when prices are lower, they make a profit. That's
why they started a lobby and media campaign aimed at achieving increased gold
sales and lending and thus a fall in gold prices. One of the biggest holders
of gold was the Swiss National Bank. When it announced its intention to sell
gold, it signaled lasting lower prices in the metal. Thus the second phase
began on November 21, 1996 at 10:01 A.M.
 
Figure 2: The
phases of gold suppression
One of the main
characteristics of the second phase was the conflicting interests involved.
Profit minded carry traders wanted lower gold prices, while central banks
were satisfied with prices at least no longer falling. For that reason
central banks increasingly fought against prices continuing lower; even
Greenspan, who was among the initiators of gold intervention, now spoke in
favor of gold. The other side included carry traders and a few politicians,
which led to gold sales by the UK. Despite the downward trend in gold, there
was an upper price limit during the second phase; which was pegged at 300
dollars per ounce. In addition there was agreement over a final year-end
price of 290 dollars on the Comex futures market.
Phase III
As gold stock piles at
central bank vaults continued to dwindle; it became obvious that prices could
no longer continue to be held at low levels. That's why in May, 2001 the best
known of the carry traders were informed that they would have to expect rising
gold prices at the end of the year. What happened then could have come from
the pages of a crime novel: Several large market participants looking to take
advantage of the situation forced the carry traders out of their huge short
gold positions as the price of the metal exploded. Their action commenced on
May 18, 2001 at 12:31 PM, thus ringing in the third phase - and that, even
though their last attempt to trigger a price explosion had ultimately failed
on the dominance of the central banks. However now it was clear that in the
long run gold prices could no longer be held down. What's more, since those
very days the structure of the futures market has changed in an essential
way. According to official US trading statistics, commercial traders are now
markedly positioned on the sell side of the market on permanent basis. The
following figure shows positioning of the "commercials" in the
futures markets.
Figure 3: Net positioning of the commercials
The third phase
is typified by a climbing gold price. The goal now is no longer to hold
prices steady or even to push them back down, but simply to prevent them from
rising too rapidly. But also the strategy of supplying the market with
stockpiles of central bank gold has changed. Until 2001, reserve banks had
suppressed gold prices by selling and lending ever larger amounts of the
physical metal to the market. But by doing so they had put themselves at
risk: Loans were running at several times yearly consumption, an amount the
banks could hardly take back through normal channels. That's why since 2001
central banks sell
about as much as they are able to take back in loaned gold. In essence they
return loaned gold back to themselves. Effectively since the third phase
began, gold no longer finds its way back to the markets from the central
banks. Gold's climb goes right along with it.
Phase IV?
Since 2008 the question has
been whether we are now in the final phases of systematic gold intervention
activities. In the wake of the financial crisis, large scale doubt about the
stability of the currency system surfaced again for the first time in years.
A rise in gold prices can still be prevented through massive interventions.
There has also been far stronger intra-day price movement as in previous
years. But what does gold have to do with the global crisis?
To this, the final figure
shows the entire world's debt compared with its economic potential. Included
is not only the debt of countries, but also that of households and companies,
because in the final analysis they also must be supported by economic
potential. In addition the financial crisis has shown that the state must
directly or indirectly accept private sector debt on its books in order to
prevent collapse.
Figure 4: Total
world debt compared to gross world product
Since the 1960s, the world's
total debt has more than doubled compared to global economic potential.
Classically the end of this kind of credit bubble results in collapse and
default. These days, nations generally act to prevent that in order to avoid
strong deflation and crisis. What possible outcome is demonstrated by Japan,
which as early as the 1990s, was mired in excessive debt similar to the way
the entire world is today. In Japan, it ended in decade-long stagnation, but
at least not in catastrophe (at least not yet). In the best case, even
climbing out of debt is possible the way Great Britain did after the Second
World War. However conditions in those days differed dramatically. Besides,
globally speaking there has never been a measurable reduction of debt for
decades now (even from much lower levels). That brings us to another road down
which an over indebted economy can travel. It has to do with the Janus face
of debt: One man's debt is another's certified claim. If inflation
expectations increase these claims could end up in circulation, which would
mean a sort of flight to material assets. Because of large holdings of debt
paper, potential for demand is high and with it an accordingly high potential
for an advance in prices. That type of scenario is still not visible on the
horizon. But if it should come to that, gold's advantages as a
non-replenishable and non-revalueable liquid asset would come to play -
exactly the same advantages that have been motivating the central banks to
execute interventions since 1993.
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